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Comments  and 
Discussion 
Martin  Feldstein: The paper  by Howrey  and  Hymans  represents  a serious 
effort  to approach  an important  issue in a new way. The low saving  rate 
of the United States in comparison  to most other industrial  nations is 
notorious.  It is not surprising,  therefore,  that a growing  number  of econ- 
omists and others who are concerned  about this problem are asking 
whether  we should  follow the lead of the European  countries  in placing 
less emphasis  on the taxation  of investment  income (relative  to consump- 
tion and payrolls) and in devising  special  schemes  to exempt  a substan- 
tial fraction  of personal  interest  income  from the individual  income  tax. 
The Howrey-Hymans  paper  seeks  to contribute  to the analysis  of that  tax 
policy question  by measuring  the effect  of the real  net-of-tax  interest  rate 
on what  the authors  call personal  cash saving. 
The authors  are certainly  correct  that theory  alone cannot  predict  the 
effect  on the saving  rate  of a change  in the net-of-tax  interest  rate.  Indeed, 
the ambiguity  is even greater  than  they appear  to realize  when  they refer 
to the countervailing  income  and  substitution  effects.  Even  if we consider 
a compensated  change,  such as increasing  the payroll tax and reducing 
the rate of tax on interest  income, theory  cannot  predict  the sign of the 
personal  saving  response.'  All that  we know  from  microeconomic  theory 
is that a compensated  increase  in the interest  rate (that is, a compensated 
fall in the price  of future  consumption)  causes  an increase  in the quantity 
of future  consumption.  But current  saving  is equivalent  to expenditure  on 
future  consumption.  The expenditure  on future  consumption  only rises  in 
response  to a compensated  fall in its price if the compensated  demand 
1. This paragraph  and the next are discussed  more fully in Martin  Feldstein, "The 
Rate of Return, Taxation and Personal Savings,"  Economic Journal, vol. 88 (Sep- 
tember 1978), pp. 482-87. 
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elasticity  exceeds one. The substitution  of a payroll tax for an interest 
income tax may therefore  reduce  current  personal  saving. 
Despite this ambiguity  about personal  saving, traditional  theory has 
an unambiguous  implication  about  the effect  on total national  saving.  A 
compensated  tax change  that  raises  the real  net return  on personal  saving 
unambiguously  reduces present personal consumption.  If government 
consumption  remains  unchanged,  total national  consumption  must fall. 
Thus total national  saving (government,  private,  or both) must  increase. 
It is nevertheless  interesting  to consider  empirically  the magnitude  of 
the saving  effect  of uncompensated  changes  in the real net yield. Unfor- 
tunately,  such an analysis  is difficult  to do in a convincing  way. The basic 
problem  is that  the expected  real  net yield available  to individual  savers  is 
not observable  and is hard to measure.  What asset or combination  of 
assets  should  one look at to measure  the yield?  Savings  accounts?  Series  E 
savings  bonds?  Corporate  bonds?  Corporate  equities?  Mortgage  interest 
rates?  Consumer  credit rates?  The yields on these assets have behaved 
differently  and there is no obvious choice among  them. The problem  is 
exacerbated  because  the mix of assets and liabilities  differs  among  indi- 
viduals  according  to their  tax situation,  wealth,  and other  circumstances. 
And what about expected inflation?  The Michigan  Survey  Research 
Center  responses  deal with very short-run  inflation  expectations,  not the 
horizon  of fifteen  or twenty  years  needed  for calculating  real returns  on 
the long-term  bonds that the authors  use to measure  the interest  rate ap- 
propriate  to life-cycle  saving  decisions.  The autoregressive  extrapolations 
used by Michael  Boskin  may be better,  but they clearly  introduce  a fur- 
ther  source  of noise. 
If we limit attention  to a bond interest  rate, the real pretax  yield has 
remained  approximately  constant.  All the variations  in the net yield  there- 
fore reflect changes in the effective tax rate. But what is the relevant 
effective  tax rate for this aggregate  equation?  It is a weighted  average  of 
marginal  tax rates,  but with what weights?  Certainly  the weights  are not 
income  or ex post saving.  This crucial  variable  is hard  to define  correctly 
and harder  to measure  in practice. 
In summary,  the key variable  in the analysis-the  real net yield-is 
subject  to substantial  measurement  error.  Even if this error  is purely  ran- 
dom, the traditional  errors-in-variables  analysis  implies  that  its coefficient 
will be biased  toward  zero. But there  is no reason  to believe  that  this  error 
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a trend  or if the error  is correlated  with any of the other  variables  could 
bias  the interest  coefficient  in any  direction. 
The problem  is exacerbated  (and the fruitful  use of instrumental  var- 
iable estimation  precluded) by the small effective  sample  size: no more 
than  twenty-three  annual  observations  and  as many  as eleven  explanatory 
variables  in a single equation.  With possibly little variation  in the ex- 
pected  real net yield (or its certainty  equivalent),  substantial  noise in its 
measurement,  and a relatively  small sample  size, there  is insufficient  in- 
formation  in the data to provide useful parameter  estimates.  While I 
recognize  the dangers,  I am more  sympathetic  to Boskin's  decision  to use 
a longer  sample  period  in which  there  was  greater  variation  in the relevant 
variable,  thereby  both reducing  the likely ratio of noise to signal and 
increasing  the sample  size. 
Let me now tum to the principal  innovation  in the paper,  the focus on 
personal  cash saving.  I think  that specification  of saving  behavior  in this 
way is basically a mistake.  A reasonable  theory of individual  long-run 
decisionmaking  should  focus on a much broader  concept  of saving  that 
more closely resembles  the increase  in the individual's  net worth. The 
authors  recognize  this to some extent by including  some proxies for a 
number  of other forms of wealth accumulation  among the explanatory 
variables,  implicitly  treating  personal  cash saving as conditional  on the 
other  forms  of saving.  Unfortunately,  these  other  saving  measures  are  not 
defined  in a satisfactory  way.  Why  is gross  business  saving  included  rather 
than net saving?  Why are employer  and personal  contributions  to social 
security  used  instead  of "social  security  wealth"  or some  other  measure  of 
expected  benefits?  The government  surplus  is included  even though  it is 
an endogenous  variable: a disturbance  that increases consumption  is 
likely  to raise  tax revenues  and increase  the government  surplus,  a corre- 
lation that  may account  for the negative  sign on that variable  in the sav- 
ing equation.  Moreover,  the theoretical  case for including  the government 
surplus  among  the explanatory  variables  implies  that  the correct  variable 
is the change  in real  government  debt;  obviously,  recent  deficits  have  been 
offset  to a considerable  extent  by the effect  of inflation  on the real value 
of such  debt. 
Then there  is the issue of tax policy. What  would be the appropriate 
policy implication  if the authors'  conclusion  that the uncompensated  in- 
terest elasticity  of saving is zero were accepted?  Contrary  to the final 
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and work effort  were both zero, a substantial  welfare  gain would result 
from  reducing  the tax on interest  and  increasing  the tax on wage  income. 
The intuitive  reasons for this statement,  which I have proven formally 
elsewhere,2  are that welfare gains depend on compensated  supply elas- 
ticities,  and  the relevant  price  elasticity  for intertemporal  distortion  is the 
quantity  elasticity  (future  consumption)  rather  than  the smaller  expendi- 
ture  elasticity  (saving). 
More generally,  what policy implication  follows if one believes  that a 
higher  saving rate would be desirable  but accepts the view implied by 
this paper  that our methods  of statistical  measurement  are not powerful 
enough  to assess  the effect  of the interest  rate on the basis of the experi- 
ence of the recent decades?  Howrey and Hymans  state that the tax on 
interest  income should be lowered only if there were a "reliably  mea- 
sured"  and "important"  effect  on behavior.  Why?  Because  a compensated 
reduction  in the tax can be predicted  to increase  national saving. The 
worst that can happen is that the increase  may be small. There seems 
nothing  to lose and  everything  to gain  by trying. 
Some participants  at this meeting  will object  on the grounds  that any 
move away  from  taxing  all income at the same  rate  is somehow  unfair.  I 
reject  this point of view for two reasons.  First, I believe the current  tax 
laws are unfair  to those who cannot  benefit  from the many  special  rules 
that allow some forms of saving  to go untaxed (accrued  gains, pension 
contributions,  IRAs, Keoghs,  homeowner  reinvestment  rollovers,  and so 
forth). Second,  and more  fundamentally,  I believe  that a fair tax system 
allocates  the tax burden  on the basis of consumption  rather  than  income. 
As is well known, a progressive  tax on consumption  is equivalent  to an 
income  tax that  exempts  all investment  income.3 
Finally, it is interesting  to ask why other countries  like France  have 
tax policies  that are  much  more  favorable  to capital  accumulation  in gen- 
eral and to saving  by low- and middle-income  families  in particular.  It is 
certainly  not that they are less egalitarian  or more committed  to private 
enterprise  capitalism.  Perhaps  they know something  that  we do not. Per- 
haps the answer  lies in the differences  in our historical  experience  and 
intellectual  tradition:  the current  European  tax policies may reflect an 
2.  See Martin Feldstein, 'The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation,"  Jour- 
nal of Political Economy, vol. 86 (April 1978, pt. 2),  pp. S29-S51. 
3.  Exceptions occur when there are differences  in progressivity  that reflect timing 
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earlier  desire  to rebuild  capital  stock after  the war while tax policies in 
the United States  are conditioned  by the vestiges  of a Keynesian  fear of 
oversaving  that was never  very  influential  on the Continent  but that still, 
remarkably,  influences  economists  in the United  States  and  Britain. 
John  B. Shoven: This is an important  paper  on a topic that has received 
increasing  attention  and deserves  more. The authors,  as well as those 
whose previous  work  is examined  in this article,  are to be congratulated 
for their  work on such a key issue. In all growth  and macro  models  two 
important  variables  are the average  and marginal  propensities  to save. 
In all evaluations  of the general  efficiency  of the economy,  the consump- 
tion-saving  margin-that  is, the intertemporal  allocation of consump- 
tion-is  second  in importance  only to the labor-leisure  choice.  In political 
discussions  regarding  the competitiveness  of the U.S. economy in the 
world  market,  the analysis  of saving  behavior  is often  looked  upon as the 
major problem. And, most relevant to the paper, the debate on how 
heavily  capital  income  should  be taxed  depends  crucially  on the elasticity 
of substitution  between  present  and future  consumption,  which  in turn  is 
a function  of the uncompensated  elasticity  of saving  with respect  to the 
real after-tax  rate  of return  estimated  here.  The authors  should,  however, 
explicitly  recognize  that  it is the substitution  elasticity  that is the variable 
of final  interest  when  considering  efficiency,  and  that  a zero elasticity  with 
respect  to the real  rate  of return  implies  a unity  rather  than a zero substi- 
tution  elasticity.  One final  word  regarding  the efficiency  consequences  of 
all this: it is important  to bear in mind  that this is a "second-best"  prob- 
lem. Eliminating  the taxation  of saving  certainly  will improve  efficiency 
by itself. However,  the lost revenue  must be made up in some manner, 
presumably  one imposing  inefficiencies  upon the economy.  The replace- 
ment tax must  be considered  in order  to complete  the analysis. 
The paper  begins  with definitions  of types of saving  and their  relative 
magnitudes.  The first striking  fact is that personal  cash saving (the net 
accumulation  of demand  plus savings  accounts,  bonds, new equities,  and 
so on) amounts  to only a small  fraction  of gross  private  saving.  Table 2 
indicates  that personal  cash saving  was only 14 percent  of NIPA gross 
private  saving  in 1975 and only 20 percent  of business  cash saving.  Per- 
sonal cash saving accounts  for approximately  35 percent  of net private 
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saving  is shown  to be only 0.22 percent  for the period  1951-74. Certainly 
the direct  effect of this form of saving  is relatively  small in determining 
economic  growth.  Unless  Howrey  and  Hymans  impute  business  cash sav- 
ing to consumers  and unless  it is total private  saving  that is interest-rate 
sensitive,  their measure  of interest  elasticity  may be misleading  in terms 
of policy implications  because  it applies  to such an unimportant  compo- 
nent  of the entire  picture. 
Howrey  and  Hymans  also discuss  the inclusion  of the accumulation  of 
consumer  durables,  net mortgage  repayment,  and imputations  in FF sav- 
ing and (with the exception  of consumer  durables)  in NIPA saving.  They 
argue,  correctly  I think,  that these forms  of saving  are not what persons 
concerned  with capital  formation  have in mind.  However,  in a complete 
portfolio  model of consumer  behavior,  the stocks and accumulations  of 
these items  will affect  loanable-funds  saving. 
A major  portion  of this paper  is devoted  to a reexamination  of three 
alternative  approaches  to the examination  of saving  behavior. 
First, and most controversially  I suppose,  they look at the aggregate 
consumption-function  approach associated with Michael Boskin. The 
technique  is to add the real after-tax  rate of return  and inflation  as ex- 
planatory  variables  to a relatively  simple aggregate  consumption  func- 
tion. Saving  behavior  is inferred  implicitly.  The central  Boskin result  is 
that the uncompensated  elasticity  is +0.4, which  is derived  from the ex- 
amination  of eight  different  specifications  and  econometric  approaches  to 
the basic  equation  reported  in this  paper. 
Howrey  and  Hymans  also challenge  the robustness  of Boskin's  results. 
Each permutation  of the data set or econometrics  they make (including 
the deletion  of 1934, the depression,  substituting  U2 for U, and  most  im- 
portantly,  using actual  interest  rates  rather  than expected  rates) reduces 
the saving elasticity and frequently  reduces it so that it is no longer 
statistically  significantly  different  from  zero. 
I have several  comments  that apply  both to Boskin's  work and to this 
paper  by Howrey  and  Hymans. 
To begin, these are extremely  simple aggregate  equations.  What in- 
terest  rate  should  be used  with them?  Savers  presumably  look at an entire 
set of interest  rates of different  maturity  and risk classes, borrowing  as 
well as lending  rates,  expected  future  interest  rates,  and so forth,  in allo- 
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and simplistic.  A paper  by Backus  and Purvis,"  outlines  an approach  to 
estimate  disaggregated  portfolio  holdings  as a function  of an entire  array 
of rates  of return.  This approach  seems  more appropriate  to the question 
at hand. 
The strongest  result  in the Howrey-Hymans  paper  is that when actual 
long-run  interest  rates are used in the regressions  in place of Boskin's 
expected  interest  rates,  the sign of the saving  elasticity  becomes  negative 
and significant.  Should  actual  or expected  interest  rates  be used?  The an- 
swer depends  on the planning  horizon  of the savers.  If the household  is 
saving  for an acquisition  to take place twenty  years  later,  the actual  rate 
offered  on twenty-year  bonds (preferably  pure  discount  bonds) is appro- 
priate.  However,  if the household  is waiting  for a period  shorter  than  the 
maturity  of the bond (say, the saving  period  is three  years,  using  twenty- 
year  bonds), then  it would  be correct  to use both  the current  rate  and  the 
expected  rate  at the time  of liquidation. 
An entire literature  exists on how demographics  and life cycle con- 
siderations  can largely  account  for aggregate  saving.  These  issues are ig- 
nored here. In lengthy  time-series  analysis  such as this, ignoring  demo- 
graphics  seems untenable.  Considerations  of life cycle would also imply 
that savers  (and dissavers)  look at the entire  spectrum  of future  expected 
short-run  rates, perhaps  derived  from the existing  term  structure,  in de- 
termining  optimal  behavior. 
The time-series  approach  may not be the way to determine  the real 
story  here. Gleaning  the effect  of the real rate of return  on saving  seems 
nearly  hopeless,  particularly  when business  cycle effects  are modeled  by 
the unemployment  rate  alone.  This may  be why  the inclusion  or exclusion 
of the depression  years  is shown  to be crucial  to the results. 
It should be noted that Boskin has done a considerable  amount  of 
work on this question  since his article  referred  to above was completed, 
and he has produced  some instrumental  variable  regressions  that imply 
even higher  saving  elasticities  than I have mentioned  above.  In his com- 
ment  he describes  this additional  work  and  its implications  and  relevance 
for the current  debate. 
On the basis of the Howrey  and Hymans  paper,  one must  say that the 
weight  of the evidence  supporting  the position  that the real after-tax  rate 
1. David Backus and Douglas Purvis, "An Integrated  Model of Household Flow- 
of-Funds Allocations," Cowles Foundation discussion paper 493, Cowles Founda- 
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of return  to savers  is not a prime  determinant  of saving  is increased.  How- 
ever, because  of the qualifications  I have mentioned  about  both studies, 
I would still find  a wide range  of values (on both sides of zero) plausible 
for this key elasticity. 
I have some briefer  comments  on the other approaches  to estimating 
saving  behavior  in the paper. 
The authors  find a more robust  positive  saving  elasticity  in the equa- 
tion representing  the Houthakker-Taylor  approach.  However,  the inclu- 
sion of inflation  and  the uncertainty  regarding  future  inflation  do weaken 
the rate-of-return  variable  to the point that  it is statistically  insignificant. 
They also observe  that the propensity  to save from  different  forms  of in- 
come is substantially  different,  supporting  to some extent  the Cambridge 
theory,  which  states  that the functional  distribution  of income  is the pri- 
mary  determinant  of saving. 
When, in table 5, Howrey and Hymans  estimate  saving  functions  di- 
rectly (for  different definitions of  saving) rather than consumption 
functions,  they never obtain  a significant  coefficient  on the real after-tax 
interest  rate. Importantly,  they use the actual Baa rate rather  than the 
expected  rate  in this section.  They also show  that  inflation  reduces  saving, 
whereas  uncertainty  about inflation  increases  it. Here, too, however,  the 
coefficients  are hovering  near statistical  insignificance. 
The last section  of the paper,  in which  functions  are estimated  for the 
small fraction  of saving  classified  as personal  cash saving,  is a step back- 
ward in my opinion. One constantly  must keep in mind how small the 
fraction  of loanable-funds  saving  is that is referred  to in interpreting  the 
results  of table 6. The authors  examine  the degree  of rationality  of savers 
with respect  to business  cash saving  and government  cash saving.  Here, 
the single-equation  approach  is most offensive.  The direction  of causality 
implied by the equation (business cash saving "determining"  personal 
cash saving) clashes  with my belief that  these  variables  are, at least to an 
extent, simultaneously  determined.  The single-equation  approach se- 
verely distorts  the results and does not provide  meaningful  tests of the 
hypotheses  under  consideration. 
My final observation  is that this paper  does blunt  the impression  that 
empmcal  economists  are  finally  coming  closer  to pinpointing  the value  of 
key variables  in their models. That blunting  may be valuable  given the 
severe shortcomings  of the studies undertaken  thus far (including  this 
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from continuing  to tackle issues such as this, which the profession  has 
avoided  for so long. 
Michael  J. Boskin:  I am pleased  to have the opportunity  to present  com- 
ments on the Howrey-Hymans  paper.  Let me divide my comments  into 
three  parts: comments  on their  critique  of my study;  comments  on their 
estimates  of saving  equations  and  on Denison's  law;  and  discussions  about 
the relationship  of the interest  elasticity  of saving  to the desirability  of 
income  or consumption  taxation. 
My original  reaction  to seeing eminent  authors  such as Howrey and 
Hymans  devote  so much  attention  to my early  work  on the consumption- 
saving choice was that I was flattered.  Unfortunately,  as I continued 
studying  their  paper,  I noted  that  they  did not cover  in any  detail  the most 
important  parts of my work. Therefore  my first comment  is they have 
totally ignored-to  the extent of not even discussing-the most impor- 
tant results  from my Journal  of Political  Economy  paper or any of the 
results from my Treasury  compendium  paper with Lawrence  Lau.' In 
each of these-the  latter  half of my JPE paper and the entire  compen- 
dium  paper-I  estimated  interest  elasticities  much  larger  than  those con- 
tained  in the equation  Howrey  and  Hymans  sought  to reestimate.  One of 
the major points of my JPE paper was that it was not reasonable  to 
estimate consumption  functions  by single-equation  methods;  indeed, it 
was necessary  to use an instrumental  variables  technique.  In the second 
half of that paper  I did so using as instruments  principal  components  of 
a  variety of  exogenous variables from the major macroeconometric 
models. This resulted  in a doubling  of the estimated  interest  elasticity 
from  around  0.2 to 0.4, with  one estimate  as high  as 0.6. In my paper  with 
Lau, we embedded  the consumption-saving  choice in a full model allow- 
ing also for a labor-leisure  choice;  this also resulted  in precise  estimates 
of an interest  elasticity  of saving on the order of 0.4. Once again, the 
instruments  used were principal  components  of exogenous  variables  of 
macroeconomic  models. This procedure  not only accounts  for cyclical 
fluctuations,  but in principle  distinguishes  our saving (or consumption) 
1. Michael J. Boskin, 'Taxation, Saving, and the Rate of Interest,"  Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 86 (April 1978, pt. 2),  pp. S3-S27; Michael J. Boskin and 
Lawrence J. Lau, "Taxation  and Aggregate Factor Supply: Preliminary  Estimates," 
in Department  of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, 1978 Compendium  of Tax 
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function  from  investment  behavior.  Hence, I am in the somewhat  embar- 
rassing  position  of critiquing  a critique  of my study  that  focuses  on the is- 
sue of the interest  elasticity  of saving  and  uses my equations  with  the low- 
est estimated  interest  elasticity-equations that  I personally,  for economic 
and statistical  reasons  discussed  in the papers  mentioned  above, do not 
claim  to be my best results.  In brief  summary,  the authors  have  been very 
selective  in the part  of my work  they have chosen  to critique,  and under 
no circumstances  would I consider  their  results  and  reestimations  at all a 
satisfactory  discussion  of my  previous  work. 
I do not even believe  that  the authors'  interpretation  of their  reestima- 
tion of my equations  casts  serious  doubt  on the basic estimates.  Any bat- 
tery of reestimates  of any time-series  equation is likely to change the 
results.  For example,  in runs where the t-statistics  are reduced  to only 
marginal  significance,  Howrey  and  Hymans  make  much  more  of this than 
is reasonable.  Reducing  the t-statistic  so that  the estimated  elasticity  of ap- 
proximately  0.2 is only marginally  significant  is not the same as demon- 
strating  that  it is remarkably  small  and  economically  insignificant.  Indeed, 
most of the estimates  confirm  my previous  results;  for example,  taking  a 
Koyck lag results  in estimates  that are similar  to my original  equations. 
Dropping  observations,  lagging  observations,  changing  the sample  period, 
and so forth sometimes  reduce  the estimated  coefficient  to statistical  in- 
significance  (usually  because  the number  of observations  has decreased 
or because  the variability  of the right-hand  variable  is so reduced  that a 
precise estimate  of the coefficient  could not be obtained). There are a 
variety  of suggestions  given as to why the authors  have chosen to lag 
unemployment  and  so on, but again  I must  point  out that  the instrumental 
variables  technique  used in the second half of my JPE paper  essentially 
accounts for the cyclical pattern  of the economy, its growth, and the 
interaction  of saving  and investment.  Hence I must  conclude  that even if 
the work  they review  was all I had presented,  the Howrey-Hymans  paper 
would not alter my conclusions  very much. Indeed, their results  reflect 
exactly  what  I would  have  expected  would  happen  from  a variety  of trans- 
formations,  dropping  observations,  changing  sample  periods,  and  the  like. 
But again,  more  importantly,  the selective  nature  of their  critique  ignores 
the most important  sets of estimates  which,  coincidentally,  are  those with 
the largest  estimated  elasticities.  This renders  their  critique  somewhat  less 
relevant  than  it might  appear. 
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league,  Victor  Fuchs, that the female-male  wage ratio in both 1960 and 
1970, holding  other things constant,  was approximately  0.6 and that if 
one looked at the Bible, in particular  Leviticus,  one would note that fe- 
male slaves sold for 30 shekels  of silver  while male slaves sold for 50. I 
would attach no more structural  interpretation  to Denison's law, the 
alleged constancy  of the gross private  saving rate, and the inability  of 
any economic  policies  to affect  it than to the much  longer  apparent  con- 
stancy  of the female-male  wage  ratio.  One of the two major  points  of my 
JPE paper  was to point  out how foolish  it was to try  to draw  strong  struc- 
tural  inferences  about  saving  behavior  from  the apparent  constancy  of the 
gross  private  saving  rate. 
I do not see how anyone  could disagree  with this point. I am glad to 
see that Howrey  and Hymans  seem to agree  with it, although  it deserves 
more  than  their  casual  mention. 
And what problems  exist in the structural  interpretation  of Denison's 
law?  First,  neither  the numerator  nor the denominator,  gross  private  sav- 
ing or gross national  product,  measure  the economically  relevant  con- 
cepts. Human capital is omitted from the analysis even though John 
Kendrick,  Jacob Mincer, and others have indicated  that much saving, 
especially  early  in life, is in the form  of human  capital.  Also missing  is the 
net saving  of U.S. citizens  overseas,  which  has increased  substantially  in 
recent  years.  Saving  theory  relates  to net income  and  net saving,  and  again 
these  vary  markedly.  Indeed,  an interest  in gross  saving  would  only occur 
in the United States if we were strong  believers  in embodied  technical 
change  and cared  about  the rate  of turnover  of the capital  stock.  My own 
estimate  suggests  that the coefficient  of variation  of net saving  is a large 
multiple  of the coefficient  of variation  of gross saving for the postwar 
period.  Further,  this coefficient  of variation  would increase  substantially 
if saving  were adjusted  to reflect  replacement  rather  than historical  cost 
depreciation.  I take this to be a strong  indictment  of the simplest  struc- 
tural  interpretation  of Denison's  law. 
It is also worth noting that a constancy  has never been noted in the 
private  saving  rate in any other country  for a sustained  period of time. 
Michael  Edelstein  has noted a substantial  interest  elasticity  of saving  in 
the United Kingdom,  and Paul David has done so for the United States 
in the nineteenth  century.  Even if the view were taken that public and 
private  consumption  were perfect  substitutes,  so the share  of total con- 
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wealth, as David and Scadding  have argued,  the fraction  of wealth  con- 
sumed  would  still be a function  of the net rate  of interest  whereas  income 
would be a flow from wealth at the gross rate of interest.  As a conse- 
quence,  policies that affected  the ratio of the net to the gross rate of in- 
terest  would affect  the consumption-saving  choice. 
It is also worth noting some of the enormous  changes  that have oc- 
curred  in the U.S. economy in the last few decades. The changing  age 
structure  of the population  has been marked.  The ratio of retirees  to 
workers  will go up 75 percent  shortly  after  the tum of the century  due to 
the combination  of the post-World  War II "baby  boom" and the recent 
"baby  bust."  Since World  War II, the life expectancy  at age 60 has in- 
creased  about  a year and a half for men and three  years  for women,  and 
the average  retirement  age has gone down substantially.  For example,  in 
1948 one-half of men over the age of 65 were in the labor force. That 
number  is now about one in five. This implies  perhaps  a 30 percent  in- 
crease in the average  retirement  period. A large increase  in the female 
labor  force  participation  rate  has occurred.  The huge  growth  in the public 
sector  includes  a large  rise in both average  and marginal  tax rates  and an 
enormous  growth  in social insurance  programs  such as those for social 
security  and  unemployment,  which  may  substitute  for private  saving.  The 
increase  in inflation  in the last ten years affects  saving  decisions.  There 
has been a sizable  decrease  in the average  workweek,  about 22 percent 
since 1929. This alone renders  GNP suspect  as an income  measure.  The 
saving  rate  out of "full  income"  has fallen  substantially.  And tremendous 
changes  have occurred  in typical  family  patterns.  All these  factors,  if they 
had occurred  alone,  would  have resulted  in substantial  changes  in saving. 
The fact that they have balanced  out each other  is what leads to the ap- 
parent  constancy  in the gross private  saving  rate, and I see no reason  to 
give a structural  interpretation  to that fact. 
Efforts  ought to be devoted  to disentangling  these effects  rather  than 
to giving  strong  structural  interpretations  to the reduced-form  outcome. 
My own current  research  is specifically  designed  to disentangle  such age 
and household effects from interest rate, income, and other effects on 
saving. 
Let me now discuss the second half of the Howrey-Hymans  paper 
in which the authors  discuss their estimates  of saving equations.  They 
look at only a small fraction of saving. While this does account  for a 
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component  of saving  on other  components  of saving,  or the sum  of other 
components  of saving.  This is the same as regressing  the consumption  of 
automobiles  on the consumption  of cigarettes,  the consumption  of food, 
and so forth.  That  is, it results  in the usual  kinds  of specification  bias and 
correlation  between  right-hand  variables  and  the error  terms  in such  esti- 
mated equations.  Hence the estimated  coefficients  are biased, and I can 
give no statistical  interpretation  to their  results.  Ideally  what  ought  to be 
done, and I think  Howrey and Hymans  would agree  with me, is to dis- 
aggregate  saving  into its numerous  components,  include  the rates  of return 
of all types of saving  in the economy  and their  covariances  as well as a 
variety  of other determinants  of aggregate  saving,  and estimate  a system 
of such equations.  Unfortunately,  this places extreme  data demands  on 
the researcher,  demands  which  are  well beyond  current  capabilities.  That 
is why I focused  on aggregate  consumption  functions  in the first  place. 
The Howrey-Hymans  interest-rate  variable  suffers  from a major  con- 
ceptual  error.  They  subtracted  a one-year  expected  inflation  rate from a 
long-term  bond rate. Obviously,  an expected  inflation  rate over the time 
horizon  of the bond is necessary.  In my JPE paper, I contributed  such 
estimates  of long-term  expected inflation  rates. I also constructed  esti- 
mates of the long-term  expected  return  to capital from the Jorgenson- 
Christensen  data on actual  returns  to capital.  I used alternative  measures 
of the long-run  expected  real net rate of return  based on Moody's  bond 
rates,  high-grade  municipal  bond rates and the expected  long-run  return 
to capital.  While  the results  differed  slightly,  each  estimate  of the long-run 
expected  net-of-tax  rate of return  to saving  produced  a modest  positive 
estimated  interest  elasticity  of private  saving.  In view of the inconsistency 
in the generation  of the Howrey-Hymans  interest  rate  series  and the like- 
lihood that measurement  error  biases  the estimated  coefficients  (in addi- 
tion to the biases  noted above), I do not believe much  weight  should  be 
given to the equations  they report with their own generated  rates of 
return. 
A variety  of other issues relate  to the interest  elasticity  of saving.  To 
begin, it is simply  not the case that a positive  interest  elasticity  of saving 
implies that a  consumption  tax is preferable  to  an income tax and 
that a negative interest elasticity or a zero interest elasticity implies 
that an income tax is preferable.  It could be that a consumption  tax, or 
even an interest income subsidy, is desirable  with a negative interest 
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even heavier  than that at present-could be desirable  with a positive  in- 
terest  elasticity  of saving.  As pointed  out in papers  by Joseph  Stiglitz  and 
me, by Martin  Feldstein,  and  by A. B. Atkinson  and  Stiglitz,2 for example, 
this choice depends  upon the relative  substitutability  and complementar- 
ity with leisure of consumption  early in working  life and consumption 
during  retirement.  The full set of such  compensated  cross  price  elasticities 
must be known to reach a conclusion  about the desirable,  or efficient, 
degree  of taxation  of capital  income. Lighter  taxation,  or subsidization, 
of capital income increases  with the interest elasticity of saving only 
ceteris  paribus. 
Next, general  equilibrium  growth  effects imply that the interest  elas- 
ticity of saving in the overall economy is likely to be larger than that 
embedded in single-equation  consumption  estimates such as mine, or 
estimates  of the elasticity  of substitution  in utility  functions  between  con- 
sumption  now and consumption  in the future.  The growth  of the popula- 
tion and  the likely  growth  of income  due to technical  change  implies  that, 
to obtain the total derivative  of saving  with respect  to the interest  rate, 
researchers  would  have to take account  of the fact that a large  fraction  of 
total saving  is being done by the young and it has to be compared  with 
the dissaving  being  done  by the elderly.  Evidence  of an enormous  amount 
of dissaving  done by young workers  would be a strong  indictment  of a 
large estimated  interest  elasticity.  Actually  it appears  that there  is a sub- 
stantial  amount  of saving  done by young workers,  although  it is mostly 
in the form of investment  in human  capital. 
I should  also note that  there  are  two issues  in saving  efficiency.  The first 
is the "golden  rule" rate in which the marginal  product  of capital  will 
equal the rate of growth  of the effective  labor  force, or the profit  share  in 
the economy will equal the net saving rate. If saving were below this 
golden  rule  rate, as Arthur  Okun  and others  have  mentioned,  a variety  of 
policy instruments  could be used to deal with this: for example, by 
changes  in government  fiscal  policy such as running  a surplus,  changing 
social security  financing,  and the like. There is still the issue of the mis- 
2.  Joseph E. Stiglitz and Michael J. Boskin, "Impact of  Recent Developments 
in Public Finance Theory on Public Policy Decisions: Some Lessons from the New 
Public Finance," American Economic Review, vol. 67 (February 1977), pp. 295- 
301; Martin Feldstein, "The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation,"  Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 86  (April 1978, pt. 2),  pp. S29-S51; A.  B. Atkinson and 
J. E.  Stiglitz,  "The Design of  Tax  Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation," 
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 6 (July-August 1976), pp. 55-75. 700  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
allocation of consumption  during  individuals'  lifetimes  if their lifetime 
consumption-saving  choices are distorted  by heavy taxation  of interest 
income.  The second-best  problem,  as pointed  out repeatedly  by Feldstein, 
Atkinson,  Stiglitz,  Diamond,  myself, and others, also needs to account 
for misallocations  in the labor market.  These misallocations  are purely 
a function  of the compensated  elasticities,  not the uncompensated  ones, 
and even if the total interest  elasticity  were zero, the compensated  elas- 
ticity might  be positive;  if the total elasticity  were  negative,  the compen- 
sated  forward-price  elasticity  of the  demand  for future  consumption  could 
still be substantially  negative.  In either  of these cases a situation  would 
result in which a consumption  tax or a lighter  taxation  of interest  than 
labor  income  might  be desirable. 
If through  dynastic  families or any other means, households  took a 
much  longer  run  view and,  for example,  maximized  the sum  of discounted 
utility  a la Ramsey,  all the problems  under  consideration  would  be transi- 
tory,  and  the economy  would  converge  to a new  steady  state  with  the same 
real  net rate  of return. 
Let me make one final statement  about the Howrey-Hymans  paper 
and one plea for more research.  Howrey  and Hymans  do point out that 
my work on consumption  functions-as  all other  work on consumption 
functions, with few exceptions-does  not explicitly build a dynamic 
model  of saving  behavior.  I concur  with  this observation,  and  I am  work- 
ing on this problem  now. I only report  that  my original  results  did not do 
so because  I was hoping  to compare  them  with the traditional  consump- 
tion function  estimates.  And there  are  few parameters  of more  interest  in 
the economy  than the interest  elasticity  of saving.  This parameter  affects 
our notions  about  the long-run  efficacy  of fiscal  and monetary  policy, the 
effect  of inflation  on the real economy,  the incidence  of various  taxes,  the 
desirability  of consumption  versus income taxes, and the social rate of 
discount  or the social opportunity  cost of public  funds.  Further  work on 
this subject  is desperately  needed,  and I look forward  to adding  Howrey 
and Hymans  to the list of people who are working  hard  to improve  our 
knowledge  on the subject. 
E. Philip Howrey and Saul H. Hymans: The discussants  of our paper 
have raised  several  general  questions  that are  best handled  by a common 
response,  after  which  we shall turn  to some of the specific  matters  raised 
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We acknowledge  the need to consider  more  carefully  yields  on alterna- 
tive types  of saving  assets.  We also accept  as valid  those  criticisms  regard- 
ing possible simultaneity  bias in our estimates.  However,  the concern  of 
several  discussants  with potential  simultaneity  bias in our estimate  of the 
effect of government  saving (GCS) on personal  saving is surely mis- 
placed.  It is argued  that a disturbance  that  lowers  saving (the dependent 
variable) is likely to increase tax revenues  and hence the government 
surplus  (an independent  variable) and thus  produce  the estimated  nega- 
tive coefficient  that relates  GCS to personal  saving  in our equation.  But 
the presence  of personal  tax payments  (TX)  in our equation  effectively 
rules out this kind of spurious  result. Simultaneity  bias may be present, 
but  if it is, it has a more  subtle  origin  than  is suggested  by the discussants. 
A resolution  of the simultaneity  issue as well as the question  of which 
of several  interest  rates  should  be included  in the analysis  requires  a richer 
data  base than  is currently  available.  The aggregate  time-series  approach 
is subject  to severe  limitations  that  cannot,  in our opinion,  be adequately 
overcome by increasing  the data base to include observations  for the 
period between  the two world wars or by using quarterly  data for the 
postwar  period.  We firmly  believe that any chance of substantial  refine- 
ment of the estimation  of interest  rate effects  on saving  awaits  the ability 
to conduct  the analysis  as a panel study  based on a time series  of cross- 
sectional observations  on household decisions. Within that context it 
would be possible  to disaggregate  according  to wealth  levels, to observe 
units that may react to different  rates of return  and that are subject  to 
different  marginal  tax rates, and so on. At an aggregative  level, there is 
little choice but to try to identify  a best representative  interest  rate, as we 
did; the data are basically  unable to distinguish  independent  effects of 
alternative  interest  rates  at a high level of aggregation. 
Tlhe  specific  issues raised by various  discussants  are much less com- 
pelling  criticisms  than  the general  issues  just  discussed.  Michael  Boskin's 
criticism  of our work  is based  largely  on a contention  that  we have failed 
to review all of his work on the estimation  of the interest  elasticity  of 
saving.  Virtually  all Boskin's  results are based on an interest  rate pro- 
cessed according  to some "magic"  formula,  which seems to have pro- 
duced some anomalous  results. For example, Boskin's expected real 
interest  rate and expected  rate of price  inflation  imply  an expected  nomi- 
nal interest  rate  of -3.7  percent  in 1934. We suggest  that  Boskin's  results 
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series  is explained  and  justified.  It may be the uniquely  correct  measure 
of the rate  of return  to saving,  but at this  point  it is merely  the product  of 
a black-box  transformation. 
John  Shoven  argues  that  our analysis  is unimportant  because  personal 
cash saving is a small proportion  of aggregate  national saving. Surely 
this misses the point. Personal cash saving is small on average,  but it 
accounts  for a good deal of the variation  in total saving,  and that  is what 
counts  for stability  of the aggregate  source  of funds  for capital  formation. 
Shoven also argues  that the interest  elasticity  of saving is not the key 
parameter  for the question of microeconomic  welfare efficiency.  That 
may be so, but it is the key parameter  with respect  to the availability  of 
loanable  funds  that is the issue we attempted  to study. 
Martin  Feldstein  argues  that the substitution  of a payroll  tax for a tax 
on interest  income may reduce  current  personal  saving,  but that it can- 
not reduce  total national  saving.  But suppose  that our interest  elasticity 
result  is correct  and that a tax substitution  (a compensated  tax change, 
in Feldstein's  terms) leaves personal  saving  unchanged.  By definition,  a 
compensated  tax change leaves current  tax receipts  unchanged  so that 
government  saving  is also unchanged,  and  aggregate  saving  is constant  as 
well. The only possibility  for increased  saving  as a result  of the tax sub- 
stitution  must  therefore  arise  from  its being accompanied  by a change  in 
the level or distribution  of income.  It would  then  be necessary  to uncover 
and  analyze  the process  by which  the tax substitution  would  produce  such 
a change  in income  and establish  its effect  on saving. 
Feldstein  and Boskin  both argue  that  our estimated  interest-rate  effect 
is likely to be biased toward  zero because  of measurement  error  in the 
rate  of return  entered  in our equation.  As is well known,  the implication 
that measurement  error  biases coefficient  estimates  toward  zero derives 
from the elementary  situation  in which a single independent  variable  is 
measured  with  error.  We would  not want  to claim-even  if Feldstein  and 
Boskin  believe  it-that  the only possible  violation  of the classical  regres- 
sion assumptions  that pertains  to our equation  is measurement  error  in 
the rate  of return.  We doubt  that  it is possible  to point to a particular  di- 
rection of bias in our interest-rate  coefficient  with any degree of confi- 
dence. Indeed, we believe that our discussion  of how the interest  rate 
should affect  saving  according  to what is included  in different  measures 
of saving  is far more  important  and  to the point  than  is the statement  of a 
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Boskin and Feldstein argue more specifically  that our interest rate 
series is conceptually  incorrect  because  we have subtracted  a short-run 
expected  rate of inflation  from a long-run  nominal  imterest  rate. Three 
points  should  be noted in this connection.  First, a distributed  lag involv- 
ing past rates  of inflation  in place of the Survey  Research  Center  expecta- 
tions variable yields similar results in our saving equations. Second, 
observations  on an expected  long-run  rate of price inflation  are simply 
not available,  except  as may  be measured  by a weighted  average  of recent 
price changes.  Third, we see no reason to believe that any mechanical 
procedure  for deriving  long-run  expectations  of inflation  from past price 
changes  is a better  measure  of inflationary  expectations  than the Survey 
measure  we used. The Survey  Research  Center  variable  indicates  what 
respondents  think about inflation,  and its interpretation  can hardly be 
limited  to the exact time frame  of the survey  question. 
Finally, Feldstein-like  Shoven-misses  an important  point by dis- 
cussing  a problem  in which  he is interested,  rather  than  the problem  that 
we addressed.  We stated that a policymaker  interested  in increasing  the 
funds available  for capital formation  would be unlikely to manipulate 
the tax rate  on interest  income  unless  the after-tax  rate  of return  could  be 
shown  to have a substantial  and reliably  measured  effect on saving.  Our 
analysis  casts  serious  doubt  on the proposition  that  loanable-funds  saving 
responds  to the rate of return  to saving,  and that  justifies  our concluding 
paragraph.  If Feldstein  wishes  to argue  that  other  goals (such as increased 
welfare or economic efficiency) justify tax substitution,  he is certainly 
free to do so. What  we claim  is that  the argument  for tax substitution  can- 
not be justified  by the proposition  that it will change  the supply  of funds 
available  for capital  formation. 
General  Discussion 
Several  participants  continued  the discussion  of the interest  rate that 
was used by the authors  and by earlier  researchers.  Arthur  Okun ques- 
tioned the use of the Baa bond rate because  the great  majority  of savers 
do not hold such bonds. He was also doubtful  of using financial  assets 
with large liquidity premiums,  such as money or time deposits, even 
though  they are widely held and suggested  that the rate individuals  pay 
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erence and was also a rate that applied to a great number  of people. 
Frederic  Mishkin  noted that the Baa rate is sensitive  to changes  in the 
degree of uncertainty  and conjectured  that its success in the equations 
might  reflect  the response  of saving to uncertainty.  Thomas  Juster  and 
others  remained  puzzled  by how Michael  Boskin's  interest  rate variable 
was constructed  and  were troubled  that the estimated  response  of saving 
to interest  rates  was apparently  so sensitive  to this construction.  William 
Brainard  noted that including  both wealth  and interest  rates  in Boskin's 
equation  might confuse the relation between interest  rates and saving 
because  interest  rates and wealth  were themselves  related.  He also sug- 
gested  examining  the response  of net savers  and net dissavers  separately 
to determine  how much  each  group  contributed  to variations  in total sav- 
ing and  to what  the net saving  of each group  responded. 
Christopher  Sims  did  not believe  the estimated  equations  could  be used 
to infer  the response  of saving  to a change  in the taxation  of saving.  The 
historical  dynamic  relation  of the after-tax  real interest  rate to saving  is 
probably  not reliable  if used to predict  the effect of permanent,  policy- 
generated  changes  in after-tax  real  interest  rates.  Expectations  are  impor- 
tant in saving and investment  decisions, and policy-generated  changes 
would  probably  be expected  to be more  persistent  than  normal  historical 
changes  in interest  rates. He suggested  that international  cross-section 
analysis  might be more useful for identifying  the response  of saving  to 
alternative  tax treatments. 
Participants  discussed  the other explanatory  variables  in the authors' 
preferred  saving equations.  Larry  Dildine observed  that the calculation 
of imputed  incomes  often utilizes  interest  rates,  which might  explain  the 
large  coefficient  on this  variable.  He also noted  the irony  that  the authors' 
income  decomposition  implied  that saving  would  be increased  by raising 
taxes in order  to increase  transfer  payments.  Mishkin  reasoned  that one 
would have to distinguish  between  changes  in permanent  and transitory 
components  of the different  income  measures  to derive  long-run  conclu- 
sions about  the propensity  to save out of different  components  of income. 
Juster  suggested  that  the Denison's  law results  might  reflect  a rise in pes- 
simism  that correlates  with a decline in corporate  saving.  He suggested 
that a direct  measure  of optimism  be used to explore  this possibility. 
The panel also considered  the paper's  policy implications.  Sims ob- 
served  that whenever  the high U.S. tax rates on capital  income are dis- 
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certain  empirical  evidence  regarding  the effect  of taxation  on saving.  The 
argument invariably turns to  distributional  effects of  proposed tax 
changes,  and Sims asked how much  is known about  that. Okun  pointed 
out that,  even  if the evidence  on the response  of personal  saving  to interest 
rates  were more robust,  it would tell us little about  whether  investment 
should  be increased.  And if more national  investment  is desirable,  there 
may  be better  ways  to pursue  it than  by reducing  taxes  on personal  saving. 
National  investment  and saving  can be encouraged  by altering  the fiscal- 
monetary  mix of policy or by changing  fiscal instruments  such as the 
investment  credit or other business taxes. The distributional  effects of 
these policies are less tendentious.  And their effects on investment  are 
more  predictable. 